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Recent studies ofBoston 's desegregation crisis, most notably J. Anthony Lukas 's Common
Ground, have been highly critical ofthe Catholic church and its local leader, Humberto
Cardinal Medeiros, archbishop ofBoston. Their criticisms have been that the church,
guided by the ineffective leadership ofCardinal Medeiros in an effort to save its own
schools, allowed its schools to become havensfor those Bostonians attempting to escape
busing. This article is an account ofthe church 's effort to develop a desegregation policy
that would allow it to preserve its own schools but not at the expense ofcourt-ordered
desegregation and its attempt to implement thatpolicy in theface ofstrong opposition. In
assessing the success ofthe church 's effort, this article also raises the question ofwhat is
the proper role ofthe church in the construction and implementation ofpublic policy.
As a result of Judge W. Arthur Garrity's desegregation ruling in June 1974, Boston
was a city marked by a struggle between citizens who supported the desegregation
of Boston's public schools and those who did not. The struggle involved all of the city's
institutions and their leaders, including the archdiocese of Boston.
In a city that was 70 percent Catholic, it was expected that the church would play an
influential role in the effort to implement the court's order. However, the church was
facing many problems of its own at that time, including an enrollment crisis in its own
schools, a multimillion-dollar debt, and an adjustment to a new archbishop, Humberto
Cardinal Medeiros, who had been appointed in 1970 following the death of Richard Car-
dinal Cushing. These problems combined to make it difficult for the church to fulfill
expectations that it play a major role in Boston's attempt to desegregate its schools. This
article examines the desegregation policy developed by the church and assesses its effect
on the implementation of court-ordered school desegregation in Boston.
To truly understand the activities of the church during this period one must put them in
the context of a long struggle by church reformers to convince the church to develop an
effective policy for dealing with a changing inner city and of the paradigm of policymak-
ing that the church had established to deal with major issues. Although the policies and
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practices of the archdiocese of Boston on social and moral issues would in large part be
determined by its archbishop, they were also the result of a complicated and intricate
process involving a large cast of characters, both lay and religious.
Cardinal Medeiros, like his predecessor Cardinal Cushing, would be pressured by
reform-minded individuals and groups, such as the Catholic Interracial Council, the
Commission on Human Rights, the Association of Boston Urban Priests, and the Associa-
tion of Urban Sisters, to make the church more responsive to the changing environment of
Boston. These reformers attempted to convince the archbishop to develop a cohesive
urban policy, administered by an effective church agency, that could unify the efforts of
the various reformers within the church. Many reformers also emphasized the role that
parochial schools could play as the bridge between Boston's white and minority com-
munities. Not surprisingly, however, these reformers encountered considerable resis-
tance, both bureaucratic and philosophical, from the church.
The Cardinal
A complex person, Cardinal Medeiros exhibited a leadership style and personal charac-
teristics that would be very influential in determining the effectiveness of the church
during the desegregation crisis. Many of those who supported the selection of Medeiros
as archbishop hoped that he would bring to Boston the same commitment to the under-
privileged that he had demonstrated in his efforts for the farm workers in his diocese in
Texas. In Boston a commitment to the underprivileged meant using the prestige and power
of the church to help resolve the city's intensifying racial crisis.
Perhaps because they set their expectations too high or had envisioned the new archbishop
to be someone he was not, his progressive supporters were concerned over Medeiros 's
inactivity on moral and social issues during his first year as archbishop. In contrast to
Cardinal Cushing, who made his own decisions and took action, Medeiros listened to his
advisers' recommendations and made carefully reasoned decisions that were often com-
promises between conflicting advice. In addition, Medeiros, unlike Cushing, felt that the
church should not be involved in political activity. It soon became clear that Medeiros
would often need to be pressured to act, sometimes with impressive results.
Under Medeiros the church continued to support the state's Racial Imbalance Act (RIA)
against attempts to repeal or weaken it. Passed in 1965, this law stated that any school in
Massachusetts with more than a 50 percent nonwhite enrollment was unbalanced. If a
school system did not redress the imbalance the state Department of Education had the
power to approve corrective measures or to impose punitive action, such as the with-
drawal of state funding, until the school system complied with the law. However, two court
actions would force the church and its archbishop to increase their commitment to racially
balanced schools. In 1972, Federal District Judge W. Arthur Garrity began hearing pre-
liminary motions on Morgan v. Hennigan, 1 the attempt by black parents to desegregate
Boston's public schools. In 1973, the state Supreme Judicial Court ordered the state De-
partment of Education to prepare a plan for the implementation of the RIA in Boston,
effective September 1974.
In his public statements and writings, such as his impressive pastoral letter "Man's
Cities and God's Poor," Medeiros repeated his support for the RIA and also endorsed
busing as one way to break the "habit" of segregation. In response to opposition to the
planned busing of public school students in the fall of 1973, he asked "every Catholic to
examine his conscience as to the extent of his contribution to the present tension and frus-
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tration" and repeated his position that integrated education was a moral issue and "that
hatred of a brother or sister and disdain for legitimate authority and law are immoral!
" 2 In
addition, in response to pleas for an increase in his personal involvement in support of the
RIA and in reaction to the massive efforts by its opponents for its repeal, on April 4,
1974, Cardinal Medeiros personally appeared before the Joint Committee on Education
to voice his support for the RIA.
Some observers feel that the personal testimony of Medeiros saved the RIA. The arch-
bishop of Boston was still the most influential religious leader in Massachusetts and there
was some doubt whether other religious leaders, such as Episcopal Bishop Burgess,
would have testified or would have been as effective if Cardinal Medeiros had not. In
addition, in an act rare for Cardinal Medeiros, he telephoned several influential legisla-
tors to emphasize his support for the RIA. 3 Action in the federal courtroom would also
give the cardinal an opportunity to demonstrate his support for integration, because on
June 21 , 1974, Judge Garrity ordered the Boston School Committee to comply with
the RIA.
Announcing his support for Garrity 's decision, Cardinal Medeiros noted that the
School Committee had had nine years to comply with the law but had done nothing. He
also told reporters that although "busing may not be the most desirable way to integrate,"
it is "all we have right now" and is "only the beginning of the fight." 4 However, the big-
gest test of the cardinal's support for integration would be the determination of a policy
for the archdiocese's troubled school system, which if allowed to become a haven for
refugees from busing, as many Catholics wanted it to be, could have increased its enroll-
ment at the expense of desegregation
.
The Problems Facing Catholic Education in the 1970s
In 1972 Catholic schools in the United States were closing at a rate of more than one
per day as enrollments dropped 18 percent over the previous three years, with a drop
of 42 percent projected by 1980. 5 The archdiocese of Boston was no exception to these
trends. Its 345 schools with 153,344 students in 1964 had shrunk by 1974 to 248 schools
with 81,540 students (see Table l). 6 Even the usually optimistic Cardinal Cushing
had commented in 1970 that parochial schools would be extinct by 1980. 7 It was little
wonder that Cardinal Medeiros would give the archdiocese's Board of Education a lot of
his time.
Aside from a decrease in enrollment, a variety of other problems faced the archdioce-
san schools. There was a growing lack of confidence in Catholic education resulting from
the publicity given to some of the crash closings, which created fear among parents,
teachers, and pastors that their school would be next. Rising maintenance and payroll
expenses were beginning to cause a financial crisis for many schools. The educational
budget of the archdiocese showed a $2 million deficit for the school year 1972-73. A lack
of planning hid from some parishes danger signals that, if discovered earlier, might have
made it possible to take steps to keep some schools open. The diminishing number of
vocations to the religious communities created multiple problems. First, many pastors
thought of their schools as "sister schools" and felt that a school was not Catholic unless
it was staffed by religious women. Second, many schools could not afford to remain open
if they had to pay lay teachers, who necessarily received higher salaries, instead of religious. 8
The importance of the religious communities to the schools was dramatically demon-
strated in December 1972 when the two largest orders of teaching nuns in the archdio-
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Table 1
History of Enrollment in School System of
Archdiocese of Boston, 1954-1980
Number of Schools Einrollment
Year Elementary Secondary Total Elementary Secondary Total
1954-55 224 93 317 107,027 24,120 131,147
1955-56 227 92 319 108,957 25,090 134,047
1956-57 231 93 324 109,898 26,295 136,193
1957-58 235 94 329 111,588 27,914 139,502
1958-59 242 96 338 114,798 29,170 143,968
1959-60 243 98 341 117,768 30,205 147,973
1960-61 245 98 343 118,847 31,496 150,343
1961-62 243 99 342 118,637 32,708 151,345
1962-63 243 99 342 118,540 33,489 152,029
1963-64 245 101 346 118,876 34,297 153,173
1964-65 246 99 345 119,635 33,709 153,344
1965-66 251 99 350 118,140 33,422 151,562
1966-67 246 96 342 115,141 33,514 148,655
1967-68 245 93 338 110,216 33,521 143,737
1968-69 242 91 333 103,259 32,532 135,791
1969-70 235 86 321 93,176 31,420 124,596
1970-71 221 76 297 81,705 28,124 109,829
1971-72 210 67 277 73,999 26,596 100,595
1972-73 202 65 267 66,702 26,535 93,237
1973-74 185 60 245 58,935 25,834 84,769
1974-75* 187 61 248 55,617 25,923 81,540
1975-76 177 59 236 54,492 25,636 80,128
1976-77 177 59 236 52,263 25,246 77,509
1977-78 171 59 230 50,003 24,981 74,984
1978-79 167 58 225 47,585 24,431 72,016
1979-80 165 56 221 46,936 24,556 71,492
*First year of desegregation and mandator/ busing.
cese, the Sisters of St. Joseph and the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur, announced that
they would withdraw from dozens of schools in the archdiocese by 1975. Although these
communities made their decision to stabilize the schools of the archdiocese, especially
those in the inner-city parishes, their action led to the closing of eighteen schools in June
1973 and left many parents feeling bitter. 9
Cardinal Medeiros and the archdiocesan Board of Education were not unaware of the
plans of the sisters and had been formulating a policy of their own, which in part sup-
ported the decision made by the two religious communities. In a series often regional
meetings between October 1 1 and November 7, 1972, the board had presented its pro-
gram to the leaders of the parishes and religious communities. Included in this program
were the establishment of individual boards for the parish schools and guidelines for
school closings. It was also clear that other solutions and strategies were being promoted
by the board, including the consolidation of schools and faculty in areas where too many
schools competed with one another for students; intercommunity staffing, whereby reli-
gious from various orders would teach in the same school; the identification of certain
schools as higher priorities for remaining open; and the acceptance of increased involve-
ment of lay teachers and parental involvement in planning.' However, those operating
Catholic schools had to face the overriding question Was the amount of time, energy, and
money expended to keep the schools open worth it?
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The answer for most archdiocesan educators was found in the Vatican Council II philos-
ophy, which supported the belief that the Christian must play a role in society relative to
the questions of race, population, poverty, justice, and peace. The Catholic school re-
tained its immense importance because it contributed "so substantially to fulfilling the
mission of God's people" and could "further the dialogue between the Church and the
family of man," in the words of one Vatican II document." In 1972, the National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops reinforced those beliefs in a pastoral message that regarded
Catholic schools as the best instrument to communicate doctrine, to build community, and
to serve others. The schools should not only prepare students to make a living, the bish-
ops said, but also teach them "how to live with one another, how to make a life." 12
One expression of this philosophy was the effort made by the archdiocese during these
difficult times to make the survival of its inner-city schools a priority. Despite its financial
problems, the archdiocese heavily subsidized the schools of parishes in the predominantly
black neighborhood of Roxbury. For example, in 1973 the archdiocese contributed
$58,644, or more than 50 percent, to the $116, 169 budget of the St. Francis de Sales
school in Roxbury. 13 In addition, the archdiocese was fortunate to have several priests and
nuns who dedicated themselves to aiding minorities in the inner city, sometimes spending
thousands of dollars of their own personal funds to keep schools going. Many of these
church activists were, however, pressing the cardinal to take a more active role in support-
ing minority issues, especially the racial balancing of Boston's public schools.
The Church's Policy
Judge Garrity's June 1974 order to implement the first phase of the court's desegregation
plan at the beginning of the 1974-75 school year created an enormous dilemma for an
archdiocese struggling to keep its schools open but at the same time attempting to remain
true to its teachings on social justice and to its cardinal's support for integration. Consist-
ent with his consensus style of leadership and in anticipation of the court order, Cardinal
Medeiros made a decision earlier in 1974 to shut the doors of parochial schools to refu-
gees from the busing plan only after extensive consultation with his advisers.
One of the most important factors he had to consider was the strong opposition to bus-
ing by large numbers of Catholic parents. Although there were no exact figures, it was the
opinion of church leaders that among those opposed to busing, the overwhelming major-
ity were Catholics. 14 How the church's pro-busing stance would affect the receipts of the
annual archdiocesan-wide stewardship appeal, the most important source of revenue to
pay off the church's $25 million debt, was another practical consideration. The obvious
fact that the Catholic schools were predominantly defacto segregated also caused the
cardinal some difficulty in formulating his decision on busing policy. If the church sup-
ported busing, then why did it not do more to integrate its own schools? If, on the other
hand, it remained silent on busing it opened itself to a charge of ducking a moral issue. In
addition, the decision not to allow open enrollment in parochial schools at a time when
declining enrollments were forcing the closing of many Catholic schools was questioned
by a number of parents and school administrators.
Although the cardinal received input from several church officials, it appears that the
major influence on his decision to support the desegregation order by not allowing open
enrollment came from Patricia Goler, head of the archdiocese's Commission on Human
Rights. Goler had a long history of involvement in the church's work in the inner city and
was highly respected by church officials as deeply and unselfishly committed to minority
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rights. She and state Superior Court Judge David Nelson served as the liaison between the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other inner-
city organizations, such as Freedom House, and the cardinal. Goler pressured Cardinal
Medeiros to testify at the State House in April 1974. 15 It was clear that the cardinal's deci-
sion to support racially balanced schools was also the result of his personal convictions
and his commitment to following the law even though he might have had doubts about
the specifics.
Once the decision was made to support the desegregation order it was necessary for the
archdiocesan Board of Education to formulate a policy that would meet with the cardinal's
approval. The board needed to come up with a policy that would help the city of Boston
implement the court order but at the same time preserve Catholic schools.
Competition from parochial schools had long been a central problem for Boston's pub-
lic schools. Many parents were unwilling to sacrifice their children to the present Boston
schools as long as parochial schools provided a better alternative and some believed that
"the closing of the parochial schools would probably be the best thing that ever happened
to the Boston public schools. Then the parents, who can now afford to send their children
to private and parochial schools, might take a greater interest in the city system." 16 An-
other drastic solution, aside from closing the parochial schools, would have been to in-
clude the parochial schools in the busing order. Meetings did in fact take place between
representatives of the Boston Public Schools and the archdiocesan School Office to dis-
cuss the possibility of increasing minority enrollment in the Catholic schools. However,
the suggestion of Catholic school representatives that an opinion be requested from the
state attorney general on the availability of funds ended discussion of this option. 17 The
archdiocesan Board of Education was also aware that to allow open enrollment in Catholic
schools would increase their enrollment by as much as 300 percent and kill the desegrega-
tion order: a tempting option that would have temporarily solved the Catholic schools'
enrollment crisis and also made the church popular with the antibusing forces.
When Brother Bartholomew Varden, the archdiocesan school superintendent, began
receiving calls in December 1973 and January 1974 from distraught pastors warning that
people were "lining up" to enroll their children in the parish school for the upcoming
school year, the Board of Education decided that it had to make a policy decision soon. 18
Taking into consideration the personal beliefs of Cardinal Medeiros, the strong pressure
from Goler and other representatives of the city's minority community, and the views
expressed by Vatican II and the National Conference of Bishops, the board decided at its
January 25, 1974, meeting not to allow the schools of the archdiocese to become havens
for those trying to escape school desegregation.
On March 1 , 1974, the Board of Education made public its guidelines on school im-
balance. After promising its wholehearted cooperation with public officials and its sup-
port for a community effort for improved education, the board presented a five-point
procedural plan governing the transfer of public school students to Catholic schools. Any
applicant for transfer from public schools would not be accepted unless (1) the acceptance
would improve the racial balance in the school to which the child was applying; (2) the
application was due to a change in family address; (3) the family already had other chil-
dren in the school; (4) the number of students accepted conformed to the average number
of acceptances of previous years; and (5) the acceptance was consistent with the principles
of social justice as enunciated in the official teachings of the church. 19 The problem now
facing the church was to get support for this policy.
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Reaction to the Church Policy
When the first court order was issued by Judge Garrity in late June 1974 the church rec-
ognized the polarization it created in the community and the danger that students might
become pawns in the various plans to remedy the situation. Nonetheless the archdiocese
stressed compliance with the order. 20 Yet within the church, support for compliance with
the court order and for busing in general was far from unanimous.
The Catholic Press
A review of the national Catholic press of the period reflects the diversity of positions
Catholics held on this issue. Maurice DeG. Ford, in several Commonweal articles, de-
fended court-ordered busing as constitutional and symbolically necessary. Other propo-
nents of busing portrayed busing as a last resort, "not a solution itself, but a means by
which the city may eventually be brought to recognize a serious problem in public educa-
tion and work collectively and politically to solve it." The editors ofAmerica reminded
their readers that in 1972 the U.S. Catholic Conference identified the issue of race rela-
tions as a moral one that included "the right of all children to equal educational opportu-
nity" and that "busing, while certainly not a total solution, may in some instances be a
helpful and indeed necessary instrument." 21
The antibusing criticism of church policy by conservative Catholic writers was summa-
rized by Philip Zucchi's Triumph article in which he stated:
The Cardinal's directive invites criticism on several counts. First, it uniformly casts
upon the parents of children who are attempting to avoid forced busing the gloomy
suspicion of racial bigotry. Secondly, it fails to lend support to the very real concerns
of parents who think that parental jurisdiction over their children's education super-
sedes that of the government, and that busing their children into high-crime districts is
unsafe. Thirdly, it at least implicitly minimizes the importance of obtaining a Catholic
education as opposed to a secular one. And lastly, it assures the continued decline of
the Catholic school system. 22
The Catholic writer and critic Michael Novak also argued that "busing . . . was an im-
moral policy" that went against the "basic social principles of American life, against
family, neighborhood, class, ethnic, and even educational realities" and was "unfair to
working people, was supported by only a small minority of blacks and whites, and was
unconstitutional." 23 This divergence of opinion in the Catholic press was also shared by
many of its readers, including the clergy of the archdiocese of Boston.
The Clergy
The clergy of the archdiocese at the time of court-ordered busing was roughly divided
into three groups. One faction was a small but highly visible group of activist priests who
pushed for a strong position by the church on minority issues and who felt strongly that
the church could do more than it was doing to support desegregation. Many of these
priests had worked and lived in the inner city and actively participated in projects to im-
prove the plight of the city's poor, such as Tent City and the Pine Street Inn. A second
group, the majority of the clergy, were sympathetic to the conditions of the poor and sup-
portive of efforts to improve their lives but felt, as did Cardinal Medeiros, that it was
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primarily the responsibility of public institutions and officials to resolve these problems
when they fell outside the sphere of moral issues. Finally, there was a group of conserva-
tive clergy who did not understand what the big rush for minority rights was all about and
who opposed the church's stance on desegregation. They felt that since other groups had
bided their time and eventually received equal opportunity, so should Boston's blacks and
other minorities. 24 Further complicating matters for the church was that sometimes a
single parish had priests representing all three positions. As troublesome as this division
among the clergy might be, however, it was mild compared with the diverse reactions of
the laity.
The Laity
Although the division of opinion among the laity resembled closely that among the clergy,
the majority of the opponents to the court order were probably Catholic. Certainly the
majority of the antibusing leadership — Louise Day Hicks, Raymond Flynn, Pixie Pala-
dino, and William Bulger— were Catholic. Many Catholics felt that the church's support
for the court order was further evidence that it had abandoned them. "I've been fighting
with the priests in my parish because they don't represent the community," said one oppo-
nent of desegregation. "They haven't done nothing against the issue, but by the same
token they haven't defended the people in their community." 25 Antibusing Catholics were
particularly upset with the stringent antisegregation guidelines for the parochial schools.
In addition to public protests, such as those outside his residence, Cardinal Medeiros also
received numerous letters from angry laypeople who reminded him that many Catholic
schools "were built by Catholic immigrants for the express purpose of providing an alter-
native to public school education" and that "these schools are there today not for [the]
priests or bishops but for Catholic children." 26
Much of the opposition to the church's school policy focused on the rights of parents
over their children. ROAR (Restore Our Alien Rights) and other antibusing groups were
especially fond of quoting the following statement from Vatican II:
Parents, who have the first and the inalienable duty and right to educate their children,
should enjoy true freedom in their choice of schools. Consequently, public authority,
which has the obligation to oversee and defend the liberties of citizens, ought to see to
it, out of a concern for distributive justice, that public subsidies are allocated in such a
way that, when selecting schools for their children, parents are genuinely free to
follow their consciences. 27
Many Catholics also found it hard to support church leaders who told them to oppose
abortion laws even though they were the law of the land but to support busing because it
was the law of the land.
The opposition to the church's desegregation policies by working-class whites in neigh-
borhoods such as South Boston, Hyde Park, and Charlestown created for Cardinal Me-
deiros a dilemma that contributed to his inability to reach an understanding with these
people. The cardinal felt deeply the problems and pain of the poor. He understood that
many of the people of South Boston and similar neighborhoods were the "employed
poor," people who worked hard but remained relatively poor. He understood that these
people could not afford to move to a suburb or to send their children to private schools to
escape their problems. He also believed that these people got a "raw deal" and were the
victims of decisions in which they had no say. This was especially true when it became
clear that the court order would not involve communities in the surrounding area in Bos-
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ton's busing plan. 28 However, two other beliefs of the cardinal would prevent him from
giving the opponents of desegregation his support.
The first was his strongly held belief in obeying the law. In many letters he wrote to
people who criticized his position on the court order, the cardinal stated: "I am fully
aware of the opposition of a great many people to the Federal court order which resulted
in forced busing. My efforts continue to be bent toward making a positive contribution to
helping those people who are directly affected by the decision. I must act, however, in
accordance with the law, and I must help them do the same." 29 The second was his strong
commitment to the minority communities of the inner city, who appeared to be supporting
busing as a last resort to end segregation in Boston. In short, Medeiros, although he un-
derstood the suffering of the working-class people of South Boston, Hyde Park, and
Charlestown, was not willing to oppose a federal court order or to withdraw his support
for a major objective of the city's minority community.
Other obstacles also prevented the cardinal from reaching an understanding with Bos-
ton's opponents to the church's desegregation policy. One of these was the cardinal's
ethnicity. From the moment he arrived in Boston, Medeiros, a Portuguese-American, was
met with resentment among many Bostonians who could not accept an archbishop who
was neither a Bostonian nor, perhaps more important, Irish. As Boston School Committee
member John Kerrigan bluntly put it, "I think it would be better if Medeiros wasn't from
Texas and spoke English. . . . He just doesn't know Boston." 30
This problem was compounded by a lack of understanding among the cardinal's advis-
ers of the feelings in Boston's white working-class neighborhoods. Almost all the cardi-
nal's top advisers on social issues and education— Father John Boles, Father Michael
Groden, Brother Varden, Patricia Goler— were outsiders or people who had spent much
of their time in the inner city rather than the surrounding white working-class neighbor-
hoods. Although John Kerrigan's analysis that the situation was the result of "flaming-ass
liberals who are giving advice to a holy man who doesn't know the practicalities of the
situation" 31 was a bit harsh, it does explain the cardinal's remarks at a 1974 news confer-
ence that he was "a bit surprised" with the opposition to forced busing and "frankly did
not expect this strong opposition." 32
The Effectiveness of Church Policy
Despite such strong opposition, when busing was implemented in September 1974 the
church's policy was clear: it would support the court order by closing the doors of its
schools to refugees from busing. However, the strong opposition to this policy, the lack of
a cohesive urban policy and an effective church agency to implement it, and the autonomy
of local pastors would make it difficult for the church to successfully implement its policy.
Both opponents and supporters of the church's desegregation policy were critical of its
initial implementation. Parent groups in white working-class neighborhoods believed that
the policy violated the natural right of Catholic parents to send their children to Catholic
schools. Desegregation supporters, citing newspaper reports based on interviews with
students and teachers at Catholic schools, believed that many Boston public school stu-
dents had managed to transfer to Catholic schools. Afraid that such transfers would only
resegregate Boston's schools, they accused church officials of strengthening the Catholic
school system at the expense of court-ordered desegregation. However, the vehement
protests of parents unable to enroll their children in Catholic schools and the enrollment
figures of archdiocesan schools made their fears appear exaggerated.
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The archdiocesan School Office kept a close eye on the enrollments of parochial
schools within the city for several reasons: it was sensitive to charges that it was taking
advantage of busing to save its own schools; it was getting daily calls from Boston school
officials checking on missing students; and it was scheduled to testify at Civil Rights
Commission hearings in June 1975. In the fall of 1974, Father Boles, the archdiocesan
director of education, compiled enrollment figures for the schools within the city and
compared enrollment figures for the beginning of the school year 1973-74 with those for
1974-75, the first year of busing. What Boles discovered was that instead of an increase in
enrollment in parochial schools in the city of Boston, there had been a decrease of 908
students in the first year of desegregation, 1974-75 (see Table 2). 33 There were at most
four schools in the city that were apparent violators of archdiocesan policy (see Table 3). 34
The question was, however, where all the archdiocesan students and the thousands who
were leaving Boston's public schools were going.
Although the majority of the archdiocese's schools followed its enrollment policies,
enrollments of several schools bordering Boston had significant increases (see Table 3).
Schools that had noticeable increases in enrollment, such as Mt. Alvernia Academy in
Newton ( + 101), St. Mary's in Brookline (+52), St. Catherine's in Norwood (+59), and
Sacred Heart in Weymouth (+88), clearly benefited from busing. It was clear that during
the first year of busing, students fleeing busing found some refuge in the parochial
schools bordering the city. One should remember, however, that increases in enrollments
were possible to achieve without violating archdiocesan policy. While the policy asked
schools to be strict about transfer students, it did not place restrictions on students enter-
ing at the normal entry points, the first and ninth grades, since there was no way of identi-
fying the motives of those who were enrolling. In addition, the girls in many families
were already attending a parochial school, and with a little extra sacrifice enough money
was raised to send the boys to the same school. 35 This did not violate archdiocesan policy,
which allowed students who had brothers or sisters in a school to transfer to that school.
As Dr. Louis Perullo, director of attendance for the Boston Public Schools, noted, there
was also not much the archdiocese could do about families who used suburban addresses
as a ploy to gain admittance to a parochial school. 36
In response to enrollment increases during the first year of desegregation, the archdioc-
esan Board of Education attempted to tighten its transfer policy by keeping a closer eye on
suburban schools. However, it also allowed schools to accept transfers to replace students
who had dropped out or transferred to other schools. There was concern that this new
policy was easily subject to abuse or misinterpretation. For example, a school now had the
right to fill a vacancy, but was it a vacancy from last year or five years ago? Indeed, this
new transfer policy and the implementation of phase II of busing (in school year 1975-
76), which increased the number of citizens affected by busing, did lead to an increase in
the number of schools that opened their doors to students escaping busing, most signifi-
cantly in Boston.
Although the total population of archdiocesan schools decreased 1 ,412 from 1974-75
to 1975-76 (see Table 1), in the city of Boston a dozen archdiocesan schools had signifi-
cant increases in enrollment (see Table 3), and total enrollment for Boston's parochial
schools increased by 28 students. This increase was achieved by admitting 1 ,207 transfer
students from Boston's public schools, mostly into grades 2 through 6 (see Table 2),
which would imply that parents were attempting to protect younger children from the
perceived dangers of being bused to schools in unfamiliar neighborhoods. However, be-
cause schools were allowed to replace dropouts or transfers, which numbered 1,209, and
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Table 3
Enrollment of Archdiocesan Schools with









I.St. Brigid, South Boston 315 (-46)* 297 (-18) 347 ( + 50) 353 ( + 6)
2. St. Anthony, North End 292 (-26) 266 (-26) 290 (+24) 279 (-11)
3. St. John, North End 281 ( + 24) 273 (-8) 293 ( + 20) 285 (-8)
4. St. Anthony, Allston 401 (-6) 376 (-25) 416 (+40) 388 (-28)
5. Our Lady of Presentation, Brighton 477 (-49) 455 (-22) 528 (+73) 496 (-32)
6. St. Lazarus, East Boston 250 ( + 10) 248 (-2) 282 (+34) 282
7. St. Mary, East Boston 264 (-39) 251 (-13) 270 ( + 19) 269 (-1)
8. St. Francis de Sales, Roxbury 115 (-56) 132 ( + 17) 149 ( + 17) 142 (-7)
9. St. Peter, South Boston 258 ( + 18) 257 (-1) 285 ( + 28) 282 (-3)
10. Holy Name, West Roxbury 751 (+ 11) 713 (-38) 768 ( + 55) 771 (+3)
Boston, Secondary
11. Cardinal Cushing, South Boston 586
(
-124) 595 ( + 9) 595 535 (-60)
12. St.Dominic Savio, East Boston 349 (-8) 345 (-4) 382 (+37) 423 ( + 40)
13. Boston College High, Dorchester 1103 (-4) 1145 ( + 42) 1177 (+32) 1258 ( + 81)
14. Don Bosco, Boston 931 ( + 89) 983 ( + 52) 926 (-57) 823 ( -103)
Outside of Boston, Elementary
1 . St. James, Arlington 213 (+ 23) 213 228 ( + 15) 230 ( + 2)
2. St. Francis of Assisi, Braintree 317 (-62) 268 (-49) 296 ( + 28) 248 (-48)
3. St. Mary, Brookline 420 (-54) 472 ( + 52) 486 ( + 14) 491 (+ 5)
4. St. Rose, Chelsea 463 (-13) 495 (+32) 478 (-17) 458 (-20)
5. St. Stanislaus, Chelsea 180 (-4) 171 (-9) 245 (+74) 237 (-8)
6. Our Lady, Everett 244 (-22) 244 241 (-3) 218 (-23)
7. St. Anthony, Everett 250 (+48) 304 ( + 54) 340 (+36) 312 (-28)
8.Cheverus, Maiden 321 (-16) 339 ( + 18) 338 (-D 310 (-28)
9. Immaculate Conception, Maiden 534 (-71) 501 (-33) 563 (+62) 502 (-61)
10. St. Joseph, Needham 428 ( + 57) 411 (-17) 467 ( + 56) 427 (-40)
1 1 . Mt. Alvernia Academy, Newton 202 (-8) 303( + 101) 302 (-1) 295 (-7)
12. Newton Catholic, Newton 424 (+47) 388 (-36) 433 (+45) 393 (-40)
13. St. John, Newton 173 (-8) 146 (-27) 171 ( + 25) 156 (-15)
14. St. Catherine, Norwood 704 ( -105) 763 ( + 59) 828 ( + 65) 803 (-25)
15. St. Mary, Quincy 259 (-18) 276 ( + 17) 275 (-1) 257 (-10)
16. St. Joseph, Quincy 215 (-18) 198 (-17) 219 ( + 18) 234 ( + 15)
17. Little Flower, Somerville 404 (-23) 401 (-3) 489 ( + 88) 434 (-55)
18. St. Ann, Somerville 369 (-82) 336 (-33) 381 ( + 45) 365 (-16)
19. St. Anthony, Somerville 231 (-17) 207 (-24) 248 (+41) 241 (-7)
20. St. Polycarp, Somerville 228 (-16) 225 (-3) 254 ( + 29) 246 (-8)
21 . Blessed Sacrament, Walpole 402 ( + 12) 389 (-13) 423 (+34) 421 (-2)
22. Rosary Academy, Watertown 132 (-57) 167 (+35) 235 ( + 68) 202 (-33)
23. St. Patrick, Watertown 315 (-27) 262 (-53) 300 ( + 38) 288 (-12)
24. St. John, Wellesley 137 (-10) 138 ( + 1) 159 (+21) 158 (-D
25. St. Paul, Wellesley 194 (-20) 219 ( + 25) 237 ( + 18) 243 (+6)
26. Sacred Heart, Weymouth 536 ( + 11) 569 ( + 33) 568 (-1) 557 (-11)
Outside of Boston, Secondary
27. St. Mary, Brookline 330 ( + 20) 359 ( + 29) 339 (-20) 311 (-28)
28. Matignon, Cambridge 608 (-19) 631 ( + 23) 674 (+43) 683 (+9)
29. North Cambridge Catholic, Cambridge 230 (-32) 252 ( + 22) 242 (-10) 236 (-6)
30. Ursuline Academy, Dedham 340 (-1) 358 ( + 18) 385 (+ 27) 391 ( + 6)
31 . Academy of Notre Dame, Hingham 305 (+36) 319 ( + 14) 387 (+ 68) 403 ( + 16)
32. Immaculate Conception, Maiden 230 ( + 8) 246 ( + 16) 266 (+ 20) 253 (-13)
33. Sacred Heart, Weymouth 283 ( + 39) 338 ( + 55) 376 (+ 38) 376
^Figures in parentheses are differences in enrollment from the previous school year.
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to accept minority students, who composed 20 percent of the transfers from Boston's
public schools, most schools had adhered closely to archdiocesan policy. 37 In schools
outside of the city, there was a total decrease of 1 ,440 students between 1974 and 1975.
However, as many as 25 schools in Boston's near suburbs experienced significant enroll-
ment increases, which also appeared to come in large part from Boston transfers, perhaps
as many as 1 , 100. 38 Yet, there were 181 archdiocesan schools in Boston and its near sub-
urbs and in 1974-75 only 16, or 8.8 percent, appeared to take advantage of busing to
enhance their enrollments significantly. Although the number of schools in Boston and its
near suburbs with significant increases in enrollments rose to 35, or 19.3 percent, in
1975-76, it appeared that adherence to archdiocesan policy, rather than avoidance, was
the norm.
However, there were enough violations of the transfer policy to warrant Cardinal Me-
deiros's sending a letter to several schools informing them of their violation and ordering
them to cease. The fact that Medeiros could not take any punitive action underscored one
of the major problems he faced in attempting to implement his desegregation policy: the
independence of the parishes. As Medeiros told the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, each
of Boston's parishes was autonomous and he had "no coercive powers, only moral
powers" over them. 39
The number of obvious violations of school policy decreased dramatically in 1976, with
many schools losing a significant number of students (see Table 3), and the figures for
1976 showed a continuing decrease in archdiocesan enrollments, with a total loss of 2,619
students (see Table 1). The new archdiocesan school superintendent, Father Eugene Sul-
livan, also noted a decline in applications for transfers compared with the previous years
during busing, an indication that the issue was dying. 40
Although there was no doubt that a few schools did stabilize their enrollments by ac-
cepting transfers from Boston's public schools and that there was some underreporting of
the number of Boston residents by suburban parochial schools, other significant factors
led to a stabilization of parochial school enrollments. 41 These factors included an increase
in professional planning, which made clearer the responsibilities of the various educa-
tional agencies of the archdiocese; the acceptance that schools could be staffed mostly by
lay teachers and remain Catholic; and the increasing affluence of Catholics, which made
them better able to support schools with lay staffs. Many schools also launched aggressive
enrollment campaigns, which in several instances led to significant increases in enroll-
ment. The most successful example, Central Catholic High School in Lawrence (unaf-
fected by the Boston situation), increased its enrollment by 161 students between 1973
and 1975. Several school closings increased the enrollments of neighboring schools, since
close to 50 percent of students affected by the closings transferred to other Catholic
schools. 42 Before, during, and after the court-ordered desegregation of Boston's public
schools, the number one priority of Catholic educators was to keep their schools open. By
1976 their efforts appeared to be showing positive results.
The degree of adherence to the church's school policy was of the utmost importance to
the success or failure of the desegregation of Boston's public schools. Much of the criti-
cism of mandatory busing focused on its potential to cause white flight from the belea-
guered schools, which would only result in the resegregation of the cities. An important
element in white flight was the extent of pupil transfers to private schools during the first
years of desegregation.
In Boston the potential for white flight was quite high because many of the ingredients
for it were present: a large, urban public school district with a significant proportion of
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minority students (42 percent), a high proportion of Catholics among the white popula-
tion, overwhelmingly white suburban school districts, a desegregation plan limited to the
central city, a significant proportion of white students assigned to the busing program,
and an archdiocesan school system in the midst of a ten-year period of decline. 43 It is,
however, very difficult to determine the exact effect that parochial schools had on the
implementation of school desegregation in Boston because of the questionable accuracy
of enrollment and transfer figures, especially for the Boston public schools.
While it can be determined that from 1974 to 1976 close to 2,500 white students trans-
ferred to parochial schools from Boston's public schools, it is impossible to get an accu-
rate figure of the total number of white students who left the Boston public schools during
the first three years of busing. Official figures indicate a loss of 9,929 white students
from 1974 to 1976. But some of those closely involved in the desegregation process main-
tain that enrollment figures prior to 1975 were inflated and that the loss of white students
may have been as low as 5,000.^ In other words, Boston's parochial schools absorbed
between 25 and 50 percent of the white students who fled busing. A recent study of white
residents in a sample of Boston neighborhoods who withdrew their children from Bos-
ton's public schools because of busing found that 55 percent transferred their children to
parochial schools and remained residents of Boston, while 45 percent moved to the sub-
urbs to escape busing. 45 While these figures would tend to support the position that Catho-
lic schools absorbed a high percentage of white students fleeing busing, they also imply
that parochial schools were retardants to residential relocation.
The Church and Desegregation
Aside from enrollment and transfer policies, archdiocesan school officials and church
activists were also concerned about the lack of minority students and teachers in parochial
schools, which in 1974-75 had 4,029 minority students or 4.9 percent of their total en-
rollment. 46 It was very difficult for the church not to appear hypocritical in its support for
the desegregation of Boston's public schools if its own schools were defacto segregated.
Accordingly, in February 1975, the archdiocesan Board of Education launched a cam-
paign to explore the possibility of further integrating parochial schools. As part of this
campaign, Superintendent Varden sent a survey to all archdiocesan schools in an attempt
to discover where there were empty seats, how much it would cost to fill them with minor-
ity students, and, by requiring the signature of both the pastor and principal, where there
was support for such an effort. Although archdiocesan schools were far from integrated,
some notable successes, such as St. Gregory's in Dorchester, resulted from this effort.
Ironically, the church's support for black community parish schools in Roxbury created
a potentially embarrassing situation. These schools attracted black students from all areas
of the city, were close to 100 percent nonwhite, and fostered a black nationalist philosophy
that opposed integration. In January 1976, Patricia Goler warned Father Boles that the
existence of such schools was "an apparent dichotomy of the cardinal's support for inte-
grated public schools" and could be used against the cardinal if it became public knowl-
edge. She also suggested that "carrots" be offered to black schools to encourage them to
integrate.
47 At the time, Father Boles decided to maintain the status quo and gamble, cor-
rectly as it turned out, that this would not become an issue.
It was, however, not clear at the time of busing whether Catholic schools should be
integrated if they were not already. Several black community leaders, such as state Repre-
sentative Melvin King, supported an increase in the number of black students attending
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Catholic schools. Others, however, were asking questions such as Were Catholic schools
inherently unequal if they were segregated? Was the best way to serve the black commu-
nity through the integration of Catholic schools, most of which had few black students
who were Catholic and most of which were located in the inner city? Would the meager
integration of Catholic schools, because of the small number of black students in them,
take away blacks' control of their own future and destiny? Rather than waste energy at-
tempting to integrate schools artificially, it seemed more fruitful to expend energy to
demonstrate that an all-black school could be as fine as any other school of high quality.
The church, faced with a variety of external and internal pressures, achieved mixed
results in its attempt to implement its transfer policy and to integrate its schools. There is
no doubt that some diocesan schools took advantage of court-ordered desegregation to
stabilize their enrollments and that there was not much Cardinal Medeiros or other church
officials could do to stop them. It was also true that archdiocesan schools remained segre-
gated, not only because there had never been a sincere effort to desegregate them but also
because there was no consensus in the minority community or the church hierarchy that
integrated Catholic schools were desirable.
On the other hand, the large majority of Catholic schools adhered to the church's trans-
fer policy. It was, one could argue, surprising and laudable that so many schools resisted
temptation and supported the policy, despite intense criticism of the policy within their
church communities, their own enrollment problems, and the reality that the cardinal
could not force them to do so. Although the church was devoted to keeping Catholic
schools open, it would not be at the expense of the effort to desegregate Boston's public
schools. It is clear that recent studies of Boston's desegregation crisis, including J. An-
thony Lukas's Common Ground, which have criticized the church for allowing its schools
to become havens for those Bostonians attempting to escape busing, have been oversimpli-
fications of a very complex picture.
The Church's Failure to Play a Major Role
Many people involved in the process of desegregating Boston's schools expected that the
church would play a larger role in the process. An examination of the reasons why it did
not requires a discussion both of the manner in which the church makes and implements
its policy decisions and of the role the church can realistically be expected to play in im-
plementing major public policy.
Simply stated, the major reason the church would not be a major player in achieving the
desegregation of Boston's schools, before or after court-ordered busing, was that it was
unable to develop a coordinated and consistent urban policy. 48 The absence of an effective
urban policy was caused in large part by the church's inability to make its social teachings
appreciated as fundamental. If the teachings of the church on social justice had been
taught and received, the problems caused by desegregation would not have been as great.
Some of the blame for the church's failure to convey its message on social justice must
fall on Cardinal Medeiros. While he should be commended for his concern for the poor
and his belief in racial, social, and economic justice, Medeiros was simply unable to get
his views across to many who needed to learn from his teachings. Burdened with the
misfortune of having to succeed the extremely popular Cardinal Cushing, Medeiros was
also, because of his ethnic background, a victim of racism. Yet Cardinal Medeiros was to
become in some observers' opinions the minorities' cardinal and may have been able to
use his support among minority groups as a power base. 49 However, his consensus style of
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leadership, in combination with the policymaking structure of the church, would most
likely have made it impossible for him to use this power base effectively even if he knew
how to do so.
One of Medeiros's major goals was to reorganize the archdiocesan government by in-
troducing a cabinet system that would divide the administration of the archdiocese into
offices headed by directors. He was, however, unable to overcome the strong resistance to
his plan by the bishops and was able to create only an Office of Education. While it is
uncertain that any archbishop could accomplish such far-reaching change, Medeiros's
consensus style of leadership was the primary reason for his failure to reorganize the
archdiocese. This meant that the church would face the desegregation issue with the same
highly centralized policymaking structure and highly decentralized policy-implementa-
tion structure it had used for decades. Medeiros was therefore severely hampered by the
decentralization structure, in which local priests had significant power to decide how to
implement official diocesan policy or whether to implement it at all. 50
If the large majority of the archdiocese's clergy and religious had been in agreement
with Cardinal Medeiros's position on desegregation, the autonomy of the parishes would
not have been a major obstacle to the implementation of his policy. However, with a church
divided in its support for desegregation, it was impossible to achieve the consensus that
Mederios felt he needed to make and implement major policy decisions.
One could also criticize the church and Medeiros for their political inactivity. During
the attempt to implement the court orders, the political campaigns of many local politi-
cians centered on their antibusing stance as a way to win office. Influenced by the belief
of Medeiros and his advisers that it was not the role of the church to get involved in poli-
tics, the church remained silent instead of supporting those candidates who reflected its
own position on desegregation and opposing those who did not. The sincerity of this posi-
tion was also subject to some doubt considering the political involvement of the church in
other issues it opposed, such as birth control and abortion. Many church members felt
that the cardinal's plea for the support of busing because it was the law of the land, at the
same time he asked them not to support abortion even though it was the law of the land,
did not make sense.
The Church and Public Policy
The recent efforts to desegregate Boston's public housing have once again raised ques-
tions about the proper role the church should play in controversial public issues and the
ability of its current archbishop, Bernard Cardinal Law, to implement church policy. Yet,
while there are numerous similarities in the church's actions today and during the busing
crisis, there are also some signs of change within the church that may make it more effec-
tive in dealing with social issues now.
Similar to the expectations surrounding the arrival of Medeiros, expectations were high
when Law was appointed that he would begin a new and healing chapter in Boston's trou-
bled history of race relations. Also similar has been the disappointment expressed by
activists who would like to see Cardinal Law play a more active role to foster understand-
ing and unity on racial issues. Like Cardinal Medeiros, Law has, in his public statements
and through the archdiocesan weekly newspaper, The Pilot, made his position on the issue
clear. He believes that public housing must be made accessible to all and that the question
is not whether Boston's housing projects should be integrated but how that should be
achieved. 51 Law is also receiving harsh criticism from some political leaders and laity in
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South Boston, although not on the scale Medeiros experienced during the busing crisis.
Law is also finding that some of the pastors in South Boston are not in complete agree-
ment with his position on the housing issue. However, there are some indications that Law
has the benefit of leading a church that has, since the busing crisis, improved its ability to
deal with urban issues.
Cardinal Law recently made the far-reaching decision to establish the Office of Black
Catholics to recognize and nurture this minority and immigrant groups, which have often
been neglected by the church. And although the effectiveness of this office and the Black
Catholic Advisory Committee in giving minorities an important voice in church policy on
issues that affect them cannot yet be determined, the establishment of these organizations
appears to have accomplished one of the long-standing goals of church activists.
In another action, which supports the belief stated by longtime church activist Father
Walter Waldron that "when we engage in anything that improves race relations we don't
have to look over our shoulders ... to question if we're going too far," 52 Cardinal Law
recently named the Rev. Roberto Gonzales as the first Hispanic bishop of the archdiocese
of Boston. Gonzales's appointment was the result of a study of the Hispanic apostolate of
the archdiocese, which has recommended, among other suggestions, that the church
appoint a full-time director for Hispanic ministry to coordinate the efforts of other archdi-
ocesan offices that deal with Hispanic issues. It appears that after decades of neglect the
archdiocese of Boston is adjusting to the changing city that it serves.
It is clear, however, from court-ordered busing, recent plans to desegregate Boston's
public housing, and other major public policy decisions that the church has little if any
voice in the formation and implementation of policy and that perhaps Cardinal Medeiros
was correct in his belief that the proper role of the church is not a political one, but a
moral one. If this is in fact the case, judgments about the effectiveness of the church in
dealing with major social issues should be made not on secular standards but on spiritual
ones; and perhaps the most effective role the church can play in Boston is to build
"bridges" that foster understanding and unity among all its diverse peoples, something it
was unable to do during Boston's school desegregation crisis.
^
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